

## Prof. Rainer Mausfeld: Warum schweigen die Lämmer?

### Description

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Mausfeld, R.. (2012). On some unwarranted tacit assumptions in cognitive neuroscience. *Frontiers in Psychology*

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"The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. This paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. It then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. The paper argues that corresponding conceptions are rooted in four different aspects of our commonsense conception of mental phenomena and their explanation, which are illegitimately transferred to scientific enquiry. These four aspects pertain to the notion of explanation, to conceptions about which mental phenomena are singled out for enquiry, to an inductivist epistemology, and, in the wake of behavioristic conceptions, to a bias favoring investigations of input-output relations at the expense of enquiries into internal principles. To the extent that the cognitive neurosciences methodologically adhere to these tacit assumptions, they are prone to turn into a largely a-theoretical and data-driven endeavor while at the same time enhancing the prospects for receiving widespread public appreciation of their empirical findings. © 2012 Mausfeld."

Mausfeld, R.. (2009). Psychologie, weiße Folter' und die Verantwortlichkeit von Wissenschaftlern. *Psychologische Rundschau*

Plain numerical DOI: 10.1026/0033-3042.60.4.229

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Mausfeld, R.. (2003). No Psychology In – No Psychology Out. *Psychologische Rundschau*

Plain numerical DOI: 10.1026//0033-3042.54.3.185

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Andres, J., & Mausfeld, R.. (2008). Structural description and qualitative content in perception theory. *Consciousness and Cognition*

Plain numerical DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2006.11.005

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Wendt, G., Faul, F., & Mausfeld, R.. (2008). Highlight disparity contributes to the authenticity and strength of perceived glossiness. *Journal of Vision*

Plain numerical DOI: 10.1167/8.1.14

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"The disparity of highlights on specular reflecting surfaces usually differs from the disparity of the surface points. a. kirschmann (1895) proposed that this fact may be used as a binocular cue for gloss perception. this was confirmed by a. blake and h. bülthoff (1990) who found that subjects judged the glossiness of convex ellipsoidal surfaces as most realistic if the disparity of the highlights was close to the physical correct one. extending on this finding, we investigate more closely whether the effect of highlight disparity depends on the sharpness of the highlight and the relative amount of diffuse and specular reflection. we measured the effect of highlight disparity on both perceived strength and perceived authenticity of gloss. we used complex, three-dimensional curved surfaces that were stereoscopically presented on a crt. the reflection characteristics were varied using the phong lighting model. highlights were presented either with or without highlight disparity. in a rating experiment, subjects were asked to judge the strength and the authenticity of the perceived surface glossiness. the presence of highlight disparity lead to an enhancement of both the authenticity and the strength of perceived glossiness. the latter finding was confirmed in an additional matching experiment. © arvo."

Mausfeld, R.. (2005). The Physicalistic Trap in Perception Theory. In *Perception and the Physical World*

Plain numerical DOI: 10.1002/0470013427.ch4

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"This chapter contains sections titled: \* introduction \* the physicalistic trap in elementaristic approaches to perception \* the physicalistic trap in functionalist and computational approaches to perception \* perception theory beyond the physicalistic trap \* appendix \* acknowledgement \* notes \* references"

Mausfeld, R., & Heyer, D.. (2012). Colour Perception: Mind and the physical world. *Colour Perception: Mind and the Physical World*

Plain numerical DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198505006.001.0001

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"Colour has long been a source of fascination to both scientists and philosophers. in one sense,

colours are in the mind of the beholder, in another sense they belong to the external world. colours appear to lie on the boundary where we have divided the world into 'objective' and 'subjective' events. they represent, more than any other attribute of our visual experience, a place where both physical and mental properties are interwoven in an intimate and enigmatic way. the last few decades have brought fascinating changes in the way that we think about 'colour' and the role 'colour' plays in our perceptual architecture. this book provides an overview of the contemporary developments in our understanding of colours and of the relationship between the 'mental' and the 'physical'. with each chapter followed by critical commentaries, the volume presents a lively and accessible picture of the intellectual traditions which have shaped research into colour perception."

Mausfeld, R.. (2010). Psychologie, Biologie, kognitive Neurowissenschaften. Psychologische Rundschau

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"Zusammenfassung. die psychologie weist zur biologie, von der genetik bis zur ethologie, vielfältige fruchtbare und in der sache unproblematische beziehungen auf. in den kognitiven neurowissenschaften sind jedoch vorstellungen problematisch, denen zufolge einer neurophysiologischen analyseebene eine privilegierte stellung für das verständnis mentaler prozesse zukomme. der Beitrag zeigt noch einmal auf, dass derartige vorstellungen auf tiefgehenden missverständnissen naturwissenschaftlicher forschungsprinzipien beruhen und für die explanatorischen aufgaben psychologischer theoriebildung unfruchtbar sind. er identifiziert zwei kategorien von ursachen, warum dennoch neuroreduktionistische positionen gegenwärtig einen so großen einfluss in der psychologie haben. die wissenschaftspsychologischen ursachen liegen in der natur unseres alltäglichen erkläzungskonzeptes mit seiner vorliebe für konkrete, sinnlich manifeste wirkfaktoren sowie in unserer alltagskonzeption psychischer phänomene. die wissenschaftssoziologische ursache liegt in der gegenwärtigen form der internen organisation der forschung auf der basis ‚einfacher‘ und ‚objektiver‘ evaluationsindizes, durch die kurzfristig angelegte forschungsarbeiten, die einen raschen ertrag an visibility versprechen, sich in höherem maße rentieren als langfristig angelegte beiträge zu einer kumulativen theorieentwicklung."

Mausfeld, R.. (2010). Psychologie, biologie, kognitive neurowissenschaften zur gegenwärtigen dominanz neuroreduktionistischer positionen zu ihren stillschweigenden grundannahmen.

Psychologische Rundschau

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"The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. this paper brings to mind several arguments to elucidate that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. it then scrutinizes the

question why nevertheless such conceptions are currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. the paper argues that neuroreductionist conceptions are rooted in four different aspects of our common-sense conception of mental phenomena and their explanation that are illegitimately transferred to scientific inquiry. these four aspects pertain to the notion of explanation, to conceptions about which mental phenomena are singled out for inquiry, to an inductivist epistemology, and, in the wake of behavioristic conceptions, to a bias favoring investigations of input-output relations at the expense of inquiries into internal principles. to the extent that the cognitive neurosciences methodologically adhere to these tacit assumptions, they are prone to turn into a largely atheoretical and data-driven endeavour while at the same time receiving wide-spread public appreciation of their empirical findings. © hogrefe verlag göttingen 2010."

Mausfeld, R.. (2010). Color within an internalist framework: The role of "color" in the structure of the perceptual system. In *Color Ontology and Color Science*

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