“The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons or neural networks constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. this paper brings to mind several arguments to the effect that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. it then scrutinizes the question why such conceptions are nevertheless currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. the paper argues that corresponding conceptions are rooted in four different aspects of our commonsense conception of mental phenomena and their explanation, which are illegitimately transferred to scientific enquiry.these four aspects pertain to the notion of explanation, to conceptions about which mental phenomena are singled out for enquiry, to an inductivist epistemology, and, in the wake of behavioristic conceptions, to a bias favoring investigations of input-output relations at the expense of enquiries into internal principles. to the extent that the cognitive neurosciences methodologically adhere to these tacit assumptions, they are prone to turn into a largely a-theoretical and data-driven endeavor while at the same time enhancing the prospects for receiving widespread public appreciation of their empirical findings. © 2012 mausfeld.”

“Zusammenfassung. die psychologie weist zur biologie, von der genetik bis zur ethologie, vielfältige fruchtbare und in der sache unproblematische beziehungen auf. in den kognitiven neurowissenschaften sind jedoch vorstellungen problematisch, denen zufolge einer neurophysiologischen analyseebene eine privilegierte stellung für das verständnis mentaler prozesse zukomme. der beitrag zeigt noch einmal auf, dass derartige vorstellungen auf tiefgehenden missverständnissen naturwissenschaftlicher forschungsprinzipien beruhen und für die explanatorischen aufgaben psychologischer theoriebildung unfruchtbar sind. er identifiziert zwei kategorien von ursachen, warum dennoch neuroreduktionistische positionen gegenwärtig einen so großen einfluss in der psychologie haben. die wissenschaftspsychologischen ursachen liegen in der natur unseres alltäglichen erklärungskonzeptes mit seiner vorliebe für konkrete, sinnlich manifeste wirkfaktoren sowie in unserer alltagskonzeption psychischer phänomene. die wissenschaftssoziologische ursache liegt in der gegenwärtigen form der internen organisation der forschung auf der basis ,einfacher’ und ,objektiver’ evaluationsindizes, durch die kurzfristig angelegte forschungsarbeiten, die einen raschen ertrag an visibility versprechen, sich in höherem maße rentieren als langfristig angelegte beiträge zu einer kumulativen theorieentwicklung.”

“The cognitive neurosciences are based on the idea that the level of neurons constitutes a privileged level of analysis for the explanation of mental phenomena. this paper brings to mind several arguments to elucidate that this presumption is ill-conceived and unwarranted in light of what is currently understood about the physical principles underlying mental achievements. it then scrutinizes the question why nevertheless such conceptions are currently prevailing in many areas of psychology. the paper argues thatneuroreductionist conceptions are rooted in four different aspects of our common-sense conception of mental phenomena and their explanation that are illegitimately transferred to scientific inquiry. these four aspects pertain to the notion of explanation, to conceptions about which mental phenomena are singled out for inquiry, to an inductivist epistemology, and, in the wake of behavioristic conceptions, to a bias favoring investigations of input-output relations at the expense of inquiries into internal principles. to the extent that the cognitive neurosciences methodologically adhere to these tacit assumptions, they are prone to turn into a largely atheoretical and data-driven endeavour while at the same time receiving wide-spread public appreciation of their empirical findings. © hogrefe verlag göttingen 2010.”